After reading the article posted by Chris on Sunday, I wanted to hear what others had to say specifically about the perceived lack of cost-efficient counter-terrorism.
I found the following sentence interesting: "Spending ever-more money making targets 'harder' is actually a poor choice."
It's easy to see where the authors are coming from--every time we fortify one target, we leave plenty others without defense. And there just isn't enough money to fortify everything. However, if the authors are advancing the notion that all fortification is futile, I would strongly disagree. As Schneier (or Heymann) mentioned, certain targets such as air travel merit special attention. After all, on 9/11 the control by terrorists of four airplanes killed thousands of Americans, greatly damaged the economy, and succeeded in creating mass fear and uncertainty.
It is undeniable that, "Increased counter-terrorism measures simply transfer terrorists’ attention elsewhere." But this does not always make costly counter-terror programs a failure. On the contrary, I find it reassuring that terrorists are having to turn away from their first-choice targets to secondary preferences. I think it is also fair to assume that terrorists will attack the best targets first, the next-best targets second, and so forth. As long as terrorists are having greater difficulty carrying out attacks against their preferred targets (which are most likely to kill civilians, damage property, hurt the economy and create fear), then I'd say the counter-terror measures which focus on fortifying potential targets are fulfilling their purpose.
I believe that the drastic inefficiency that appears to exist in our current counter-terror agenda is largely due to the hidden costs of fear. Part of the reason Americans are willing to submit to annoying security measures is because they feel threatened by the possibility of a terrorist attack and are willing to sacrifice for the feeling of security. I think that the question is: How much is America willing to pay to feel secure? The answer: a lot.
What do you think? Are counter-terror strategies worth the cost they impose? What role does fear play in the price of counter-terror? Is it warranted? How can counter-terror strategies be more cost-effective?
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2 comments:
I think monetarily, any increase in security is a good thing, but instead of focusing so much on over fortifying different potential targets why not fortify them enough to discourage attacks on such targets while focusing more so on a defense grid that protects against terrorist movement through the Westernized countries. IF we spent the bulk of the resources on tracking and apprehending terrorists then we would not need to fortify all targets, what the authors allude to if we keep fortifying primary then secondary targets and so on... I think the price cannot get to big if measuring in dollars, but it needs to be focused on long term security not short term deterrence.
Yes, counter-terror strategies are worth the cost. At least so far. We have not had any attacks on American Soil since 9/11 so the money and afforts are meeting their purpose. Sadly, money is spent but it is not going down the drain. It is much more difficult for another attack to succeed, specially on that size to happen again because of the money and porgrams applied into counter-terror strategies
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