Chavez & Correa amass troops on the Colombian border

In response to Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's military assault on a FARC camp in Ecuador, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa amassed troops on the Colombian border. Chavez and Correa are incensed because they say Uribe violated Ecuador's sovereignty. Chavez announced that if Uribe tried to take similar actions on the Venezuelan border, then Venezuela would go to war.

The Colombians claim they were attacked from across the Ecuadorian border by FARC rebels and acted in self-defense. Furthermore, Colombian Police Commander Gen. Oscar Naranjo says that Colombian forces found electronic documents in FARC's camp that tie President Correa to Raul Reyes, the FARC's former leader. If Naranjo is telling the truth, then this is likely a case of a state's (i.e., Ecuador's) active support for terrorism as a foreign policy tool.

By using a terrorist group as the unofficial arm of the state, a government can launch attacks against an adversarial state while maintaining its own irreproachability. For example, this is a tactic being used by Iran in the current Iraqi conflict. By clandestinely sponsoring a terrorist organization that has common objectives with the state, a government may attack an enemy state indirectly.

The victimized state then would have a few options: it could choose to attack the sponsoring state directly, in which case it would need conclusive evidence of the connection between the terrorists and their sponsor state--the absence of which would cause the victim-state to appear to be the aggressor (like in the current situation in which Colombia will be perceived as the aggressor unless it can prove that Ecuador knowingly allowed FARC to attack Colombians from its border).

A second option for the victim-state could be to attack the terrorist organization, but if the terrorists are hiding across the state's border, then it would have to justify violating the other (sponsoring) state's sovereignty by providing some type of evidence that it was, indeed, acting in self-dense (e.g. Colombia's "self-defense" argument).

Finally, the victim-state could choose to do nothing except wait for the terrorists to strike again; however, this approach would make the victim-state appear weak not only in the eyes of the terrorists and those of the sponsoring state but also in the eyes of the victim-state's own citizens.

Thus, if one state is confident that it could attack another state indirectly via a clandestinely-sponsored terrorist organization, and if the sponsoring-state is confident that any connections between it and the terrorists would either not be revealed or be nebulous, at best; then the sponsoring-state may, in fact, allow such an attack to take place--knowing that the victimized state would likely be incapable of gathering enough hard evidence to sufficiently justify a proportional retaliatory strike against the sponsor-state.

This may be what is occurring in South America right now with Ecuador (and maybe Venezuela) as the sponsoring state(s), FARC as the proxy, and Colombia as the victim. Then again, this whole line of reasoning could be complete rubbish. What do you think?